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Abstract
Prey are relentlessly faced with a series of survival problems to solve. One enduring problem is 
predation, where the prey’s answers rely on the complex interaction between actions cultivated 
during its life course and defense reactions passed down by descendants. To understand the 
proximate neural responses to analogous threats, affective neuroscientists have favored well-
controlled associative learning paradigms, yet researchers are now creating semi-realistic 
environments that examine the dynamic flow of decision-making and escape calculations that 
mimic the prey’s real world choices. In the context of research from the field of ethology and 
behavioral ecology, we review some of the recent literature in rodent and human neuroscience and 
discuss how these studies have the potential to provide new insights into the behavioral expression, 
computations, and the neural circuits that underlie healthy and pathological fear and anxiety.
Predation presents the organism with an omnipresent problem to solve including how to 
predict, avoid, escape and combat threats. This problem is compounded by other goal-
oriented needs including sustenance, sexual replication via the best genetic mates and 
protection of kin. Nature is unforgiving, and solving the puzzles it presents is critical to 
survival and this has resulted in a set of actions that are learned during the organism’s 
lifetime or passed down from its ancestors. These innate and learned behaviors are 
instantiated in Darwinian theory, are both conscious and nonconscious and are supported by 
a physiology that is shaped by the organism’s ecological niche. This proposes that animals 
make dynamic decisions when under threat that include the tension between goal-oriented 
needs, energy consumption, and tactic choice, are each supported by independent, dependent 
and interacting biological systems. Progress in understanding these biological systems and 
their proximate behaviors, therefore, involves the convergence of disciplines across the life 
sciences that include ethology, behavioral ecology, computational, behavioral, and cognitive 
neuroscience, and evolutionary biology.
Ethology, the scientific study of the organism’s behavior in its natural environment, has a 
long history of investigating how organisms innately respond to threat. For example, 
Douglas Spalding initially observed that young chicks instinctively fear a hawk hovering 
over them[1]. Subsequently, Lorenz and Tinbergen used a wooden silhouette that mimicked 
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a Hawk if moved right (short neck, long tail) or a goose if the silhouette was moved to left 
(long neck, short tail), and found that naïve chicks would exhibit escape response only when 
the silhouette’s ‘flying’ mimicked a Hawk [2]. These findings, albeit controversial, have 
been supported by studies showing that looming stimuli results in innate fear responses in 
non-human primates [3] and rodents ([4]). Contemporary questions in the field of ethology 
include how animals forage in patches with varying densities of predators, the distance at 
which the animal flees from threat, why animals live in groups and in what contexts different 
anti-predatory responses are evoked [5]. In the adjacent field of behavioral neuroscience, 
contemporary neurobiological models of fear have largely been based on fear conditioning 
studies (e.g., [6–8]) which are derived from ‘snapshot’ information. In this paper, we argue 
that for the neuroscientist to fully understand these as biological questions, it is critical that 
one should examine the organism’s reactions to stimuli in paradigms that mirror the 
environment in which the behavior evolved providing a ‘panoramic’ view that fill gaps in 
current understanding of fear.
Fear, anxiety, risk and survival: an ethological perspective
To the ethologist, the terms fear and anxiety are survival responses and reflect broad 
categories each having their own behavioral and contextual profile. Behavioral 
neuroscientists, ecologists and ethologist have carefully laid out both these profiles. For 
example, Kavaliers and Choleris [9] have proposed an ‘apprehension gradient’ which 
extends from the prey exhibiting no interest to complete preoccupation with the predator. 
Similarly, Blanchard and colleagues studies using rodents suggests three levels of danger; 
potential threat, distal threat, and proximal threat [10]. From the other side of the fence, 
behavioral ecologists such as Lima and Dill [11] have proposed that a set of scenarios can 
play out when the predator and prey come into contact (Figure 1). These include situations 
where the prey attempt to detect the predator first (p) and makes the decision to avoid (a). If 
detected by the predator, the prey will alter its decision and make the most appropriate 
response for that situation. Alternatively, the predator aims to optimize the situation to detect 
the prey (q) first and can decide to attack the unaware prey (1-i2) or ignore (i2). Importantly, 
the Lima and Dill model suggests that prey will optimize the avoidance of predators through 
risk allocation and escape strategies (e) and these depend upon the context and behavior of 
the predator.
Several pioneers have made the link between ethological models and empirical behavioral 
neuroscience. One of the best known models is Bolles and Fanselow’s perceptual-defensive-
recuperative (PDR) model [12] which states that when the animal perceives threats, its fear 
motivation system inhibits other motivational systems, such as pain, that impede defensive 
behavior. Presumably, attending to pain while facing a predator is not an adaptive behavioral 
trait. The PDR concept is supported by findings that during fear conditioning rats do not 
display injury-related behavior because fear elicits analgesia, via endogenous opioids, that 
suppresses pain [13]. The anti-predatory defensive behavior seems to be determined by the 
ecological niche of animals. For example, the woodland living P. m. austerus deermouse 
tends to freeze, which is effective against its natural predators such as a weasel, whereas the 
arid region residing P. m. gambeli deermouse displays vertical leap which is effective against 
its natural predators, such as a gopher snake [14].
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Building on the PDR model, Fanselow and Lester [15] put forward the “Threat Imminence 
Continuum” model, which posits that distinct threat-states change depending on whether the 
threat context is absent, detected, or attacking. These different contexts of imminence evoke 
stereotyped defensive behaviors in rodents, where the animal will choose strategies to 
prevent or defer its progression down the imminence continuum. This continuum 
encompasses four core stages: the preferred phase is the time period when the animal is in a 
safe place, such as a burrow or nest; the pre-encounter phase is where the risk of threat is 
present, although there is no detectable presence of danger and characterized by increased 
vigilance and arousal; the post-encounter threat is when a threat is detected, but there is no 
direct interaction between the prey and predator (e.g. the predator has not yet detected the 
prey) resulting in freezing behaviors and adaptive autonomic responses; and the circa-strike 
threat is where the predator starts to pursue the aware prey with the intention of capture and 
consumption resulting in the pray either fleeing or fighting if the threat is inescapable. These 
contexts are further determined by the actual or perceived proximity to a threat [16]. 
Together, these models operationalized a set of boundaries from which to create semi-
realistic experiments that attempt to exam defensive behaviors and their related neural 
circuits.
The emergence of neuroethological approaches to survival circuits
The emerging need for semi-realistic paradigms comes with the recent acceptance that threat 
responses and decisions-making are represented along a set of overlapping neural circuits. 
For example, several theorists have proposed that survival circuits are mapped along a distal-
proximal danger hierarchy extending from the ventral prefrontal cortex - anterior cingulate - 
amygdala - hypothalamus – periaqueductal gray (PAG) pathway [17]. This neuroanatomical 
pathways is supported by research on non-human primates [18,19], rodents [20–22] and are 
also closely aligned with what Panksepp calls the FEAR circuitry [23]. These circuits have 
been further clarified by the mapping of parallel circuits via the hippocampus, septum, 
hypothalamus and PAG [24*] and the recent recognition of other important structures 
including the habenula, medial dorsal and paraventricular thalamus [25,26]. The most 
studied part of these circuits are the amygdala and PFC, both believed to be the hub and 
modulator of threat, yet new approaches including optogenetics and high resolution human 
neuroimaging are disseminating these circuits showing both complex local (basolateral 
amygdala-intercalated neurons-central nucleus of the amygdala) and global connectivity 
(e.g. PAG-PFC; [27,28]). The evolutionary purpose of these circuits is speculative, yet given 
the evidence from ethology and behavioral neuroscience these primitive to higher cortical 
survival pathways have likely evolved to enrich behavioral flexibility.
There is also increasing recognition that more than one circuit can produce the identical 
behavior and this may differ within and between species [29]. This becomes even more 
complex when we consider the hormonal, autonomic and neurotransmitter variables that are 
evoked during danger. To account for the diverse processes that occur during threat LeDoux 
[30**] has proposed that “defensive organismic state” is evoked and supported by 
“defensive motivational circuits” that are triggered in the presence of threat. Presumably, 
these “defensive motivational circuits” are determined by the context, which in turn result in 
a set of survival strategies that are optimized to escape predators [31**]. While LeDoux’s 
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elegant theory puts forward the differences between humans and animals (e.g. the role of 
introspection and subjective states), it does not integrate theories from ethology and 
behavioral ecology instead focusing on the insightful findings from laboratory studies. 
Likewise, ethologists and behavioral ecologists have been equally guilty in their skirting of 
theories from behavioral and affective neuroscience. Elaborating on, and combining with, 
LeDoux’s theories, Fanselow and Lester’s TIC model and the work by behavioral ecologists 
such as Dill, Lima, Nonac, and Blumstein among others, Mobbs and colleagues have 
recently attempted to synthesize these fields by proposing that humans and possibly other 
organisms posses five core survival strategies when encountering contextually distinct levels 
of danger. These include the ability to (i) predict the sensory landscape by simulating 
possible encounters with threat and selecting the appropriate pre-encounter action and ability 
to evoke (ii) prevention strategies in which the organism manufactures safe environments. 
When a threat is encountered the (iii) threat orienting system is engaged to determine 
whether the organism ignores the stimulus or switches into a process of (iv) threat 
assessment, where the organism monitors the stimulus, weighs the threat value, predicts the 
actions of the threat, searches for safety, and guides behavioral actions crucial to directed 
escape. When under imminent attack, (v) defensive systems evoke fast reflexive indirect 
escape behaviors (i.e., fight or flight). These strategies map on to the aforementioned 
survival circuits and the threat imminence continuum, where prediction can result in both 
preferred and pre-encounter context resulting in vigilance; threat orienting and threat 
assessment results in post-encounter freezing and flight (depending on proximity and 
refuge); and circa-strike elicits flight or fight [15]. These strategies can be flexibly altered by 
a conscious modulatory system (e.g. reappraisal of threat) and updated via a number of 
learning processes characterized by computational theorists (e.g. [32].
Active Escape in Rodents and Humans
The Mouse Defense Test Battery (MDTB) has been developed to measure defensive 
behaviors when rodents are presented with an unconditioned predator stimulus [33,34]. The 
MDTB measures the rodent’s threat responses including flight, freezing, threat assessment 
and defensive attack (i.e. fight [35]. In the classic version of the experiment, the human 
experimenter is used as the threat stimulus. A rat (Rattus norvegicus) is placed in a 6m long 
runway, and presented with the threat stimulus. Results show that rapid flight is observed 
97% of the times when the human approaches the rat, but abruptly switches to 100% 
freezing when the threat becomes imminent or if the escape route is blocked (i.e. closer of a 
door). When the threat is extremely close to the rat (about 1m) defensive attack in the form 
of jumping and biting is observed. These reactions are observed in both wild-type and 
laboratory-bred rats, yet some differences in timing and magnitude are observed in other 
strains (Long–Evans strain; [36–38]. These seminal studies demonstrated that distance and 
escapability can be used as a powerful tool to evoke distinct defensive reactions (e.g. fight, 
flight and freezing; Fig 2A).
In humans, the existence of survival circuits is supported by brain imaging research using 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and employing Active Escape Paradigms 
(AEP) where the goal is to actively evade an artificial predator with the capacity to chase, 
capture and shock the subject. Mobbs and colleagues [39] used the AEP to show that when 
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the artificial predator is distant, increased activity is observed in the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex (vmPFC; Fig. 2B). However, as the artificial predator looms closer, a switch to 
increased activity in the midbrain PAG is observed. In another experiment, Mobbs and 
colleagues [39] attempted to directly examine the neural basis of Fanselow and Lester’s 
“Threat Imminence Continuum” by creating three contexts that mirrored pre and post-
encounter threat and circa-strike attack. Consistent with Fanselow and Lester’s model [15], 
post-encounter threat elicited activity in forebrain areas, including the vmPFC, 
hippocampus, and amygdala. Conversely, active escape during circa-strike threat increased 
activity in midbrain areas. Furthermore, subjects showed increased coupling between the 
midbrain and mid-dorsal ACC and decreased coupling with the vmPFC, amygdala, and 
hippocampus, supporting the proposal of mutual inhibition between these defensive circuits 
(i.e. both defensive circuits cannot be active at the same time). Finally, the authors found that 
panic-related motor errors (i.e. wrong button presses resulting in collisions with the virtual 
walls of the maze) correlated with increased activity in the midbrain PAG and dorsal raphe 
nucleus [40] (Fig. 2B). These finding have been supported by studies using more realistic 
stimuli [41] (e.g. placing a Tarantula progressively closer to the subject’s foot) while also 
showing that keeping track of the threat movements is associated with increased activity on 
the bed nucleus of the stria terminalis (BNST), a region implicated in threat vigilance and 
sustained fear [42]. Together, these ethological inspired studies suggest that higher forebrain 
areas are involved in slower, deliberate actions to distant or potential threat, whereas 
imminent danger results in fast, “hard-wired,” defensive reactions mediated by the midbrain.
Risky Foraging in Rodents and Humans
According to the risk allocation hypothesis, animals allocate most of their defensive 
resources to situations of high predator threat [43]. These defensive responses are further 
determined by the frequency, or pulses, of high-risk predation and lost foraging 
opportunities are allocated to times of low predatory risk. Natural observations support the 
risk allocation hypothesis (e.g. [43] and suggest that predation plays a major role in foraging 
decisions. One of the earliest experiments—that simulated naturalistic situations of fear, 
avoidance, and appetitive behaviors being a meaningful, integrated part of animal’s lives—
utilized a ‘Closed Economy’ paradigm where rats lived for extended periods in individual 
chambers consisting of a safe nest and a foraging arena that had to be entered to press levers 
to procure food and that could be rendered dangerous by the administration of footshocks 
[15,44]. Helmstetter and Fanselow [44] found that introduction of random shocks caused 
rats to decrease meal frequency but increase meal size such that they reduce exposure to 
footshocks in the foraging area while maintaining caloric intake. A recent study showed that 
random footshocks also caused rats to decrease pressing the lever distal to the nest, where it 
will take the animal longer to escape from shock, and increase pressing the lever proximal to 
the nest, where escape from shock will be quicker, and that the amygdala is necessary for the 
reorganization of foraging patterns [45**]. These shock-induced changes in the foraging 
pattern are consistent with the risk allocation hypothesis.
Another ethobehavioral paradigm exposed rats foraging for food to a programmed predator-
like robot [46]. In this study, as the hunger-motivated rat approached the food, the artificial 
predator surged towards it, eliciting the rat to flee into the safety of its nest. The robot 
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effectively mimicked a naturalistic threat because its size is relatively larger than the rat, and 
its shape (with eyes, moving jaw, and tail) and surging action simulate a predatory strike. 
The robot’s disruptive effects on the animal’s foraging varied as a function of the nest-food 
and food-robot distances, which indicates that rats can innately discern safe vs. dangerous 
foraging distances. This adaptive behavior depends on the amygdala as amygdalalesioned 
and -inactivated rats did not flee to the looming robot. The main advantage of using a robotic 
predator is that it allows reliable and quantitative interaction with the rat, which is not 
possible with real predatory animals, such as a cat. The fleeing behavior can be elicited 
reliably in naïve rats simply by stimulating their amygdala or dorsal PAG each time they 
approached the food[45**]. In contrast to rats that faced the predatory robot, however, with 
amygdala/PAG stimulation the animals were unable to procure food placed near the nest, 
presumably because the brain stimulation evoked the same magnitude of fear regardless of 
the nest-food distance. Interestingly, the amygdala stimulation effect was intact in PAG 
lesioned rats, but the dorsal PAG stimulation was blocked in amygdala lesioned/inactivated 
rats, indicating that the amygdala is downstream of the dPAG. These animal studies 
demonstrate that rats adjust their foraging behavior consistent with the risk assessment-
based antipredator defensive models, such as predatory imminence [15], that postulate fear 
behaviors as coordinated reaction and action to the specific threat situation and its perceived 
proximity.
Behavioral ecologist and ethologists have noted the importance of predation during foraging 
[47]. Although there is no human analog to these studies, several researchers are beginning 
to examine the neural basis of risk taking during foraging. One of the first human brain 
studies of foraging was put forward by Mobbs, Hassabis and colleagues [48*]). In this study, 
the authors used a continuous-input foraging task where subjects were presented with two 
patches (left and right of the screen) and had to decide to stay or switch to the other patch 
based on the increasing or decreasing competition and reward frequency. The goal of the 
task was to maximize points, which were exchanged for money, by avoiding patches with 
high density of competition and low-reward rate. As it became increasingly disadvantageous 
to be in a patch (i.e. increasing competition and decreasing reward frequency), the authors 
observed increased activity in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) and the insula, 
which the authors speculate may be involved in the conscious urge to switch patches. 
Furthermore, individual differences in competition avoidance and reward drive were found. 
Results suggested that the amygdala steers preferences to avoid competition, while the 
dorsal putamen activity was associated with a drive to pursue reward. Other foraging studies 
have proposed that the vmPFC encodes the value of clear options and the dACC encodes the 
cost of foraging and average value of the foraging environment ([49] c.f. [50]).
Future directions
Ethologically inspired paradigms attempt to mirror the ecological conditions under which 
survival behaviors evolved. The preliminary studies reviewed here supplement current 
evidence using more traditional methods and have provided new insights into the brain’s 
survival circuits. The preliminary studies reviewed here supplement current evidence using 
more traditional methods and have provided new insights into the brain’s survival circuits. 
For example, the aforementioned studies on humans provide new information on how 
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increasing danger results in the transfer of threat from corticolimbic ‘anxiety’ systems to 
midbrain ‘fear’ centers, how maladaptive motor responses are linked to the midbrain and the 
brain tracks the spatial patterns of the threat (Figure 2). Likewise, recent ethobehavioral 
studies in rodents indicate that the contemporary fear models derived largely from fear 
conditioning studies may be inadequate to address risky foraging behavior in a naturalistic, 
dynamic fear environment (Figure 3). Moving forward, semi-realistic studies will allow 
researchers to further elucidate contextual switching between defensive strategies, help 
formulate new approaches to test the changing dynamics of competition, reward and 
predation risk and how the brain integrates this information to produce the optimal foraging 
decisions and open up the use of formal computational approaches used by behavioral 
ecologists. These studies will require a paradigmatic shift in experimental design, moving 
beyond the oversimplified methods used in classical and instrumental conditioning, yet 
overcoming the obstacles of balancing tight control over conditions with the fluid dynamic 
parameters that are often noisy. However, the benefits are clear in that these new approaches 
will allow theorists to create new computational models that map closer to how humans and 
animals react to threat in the real world and unify a diverse set of fields from behavioral 
ecology, to cognitive neuroscience, and evolutionary biology. In this exciting age of the 
human connectome project, innovations in molecular-genetics techniques (e.g., 
optogenetics), advances in human brain imaging and computational methods, the creation of 
ethologically inspired paradigms will provide a greater match to real-world threat and 
provide researchers with a new window into the neural circuits that underlie fear and 
anxiety.
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Lima and Dill’s Predator-Prey Model. Flow chart displaying the permutations of a predator-
prey encounters. The symbols signify the conditional probabilities of each step of the 
pathway. a= avoid; e = escape; i = ignore; p=probability that the prey detects the predator 
first; q = probability that the predator detects the prey first [11].
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(A) The Blanchard model proposing that physical distance to threat and escape (flight) 
availability evokes distinct defensive response. (B) The AET showing the neural switches 
between the vmPFC and PAG associated with distal and proximal threat and midbrain 
activity correlated with panic-related motor errors. (C) Experimental set up for oscillating 
tarantula task and (D) an example of monitoring the threats movement showing that as the 
Tarantula move closure based on it previous position compared to moving further away from 
a closure position there was increased activity in the dorsal amygdala and bilateral BNST.
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(A) A foraging rat facing a ‘predatory’ robot. Each time the rat approached the food pellet, 
the looming motion of the robot caused the rat to flee into the safety of the nest. Animals 
were unable to procure pellet located beyond certain distance but were able to retrieve pellet 
placed closed to the nest. (B) Same experimental design except either the amygdala or the 
dPAG is stimulated in naïve rats as they came near the pellet. Both amygdala and dPAG 
stimulation always elicited fleeing response in animals regardless of the pellet location. (C) 
Histology photographs show the tip locations for stimulation electrode and guide cannulae, 
and the extent of lesions. (D) Representative track plots from a rat with basolateral amygdala 
(BLA) stimulation, a PAG-lesioned rat with BLA stimulation, a BLA-lesioned rat with 
dPAG stimulation, and BLA-inactivated rat with dPAG stimulation. (E) Group mean 
(±SEM) latency to procure pellet (180 s = unsuccessful), and group mean (±SEM) number 
of times animals approached the pellet during the 180 s allotted time.
Mobbs and Kim Page 12
Curr Opin Behav Sci. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2018 July 06.
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
